Introduction by ,
1 Introduction
Customization relates to the ability of firms to provide highly designed prod-
ucts that better suit to consumers’ preferences. Product and pricing strate-
gies for customized goods and services allow firms to gain a competitive
advantage on rivals and may well explain why customization is becoming
one of the most successful business strategies and a dominant model of pro-
duction.
A customized product can be seen as a standard product modified ac-
cording to customers’ needs, like a car with some optionals or a composite
product made of modules combined by the customer. The diﬀerences in
customized products can be both physical diﬀerences and diﬀerences in ser-
vices.1 Software, music, books, as well as dresses and drinks are examples
of industries of standard or information goods 2 whose characteristics are
chosen by consumers on request, and that are sold both on digital mar-
ketplaces and by traditional retailers. This paper focuses on the role of
strategic interaction among firms in a monopolistic competitive framework
in explaining pricing strategies for customized goods and services and its
impact on market structure. In particular, we examine customized produc-
tion as a dimension of production flexibility and we investigate the patterns
and the possible implications of firms’ behaviour in the traditional and in
the electronic markets. According to these purposes, the issues discussed in
the paper are closely related to the economic literature on spatial product
diﬀerentiation and spatial price discrimination, as well as to the literature on
technological competition, on flexible production and electronic commerce.
Customization is the production of diﬀerent versions of a basic good
as a consequence of heterogeneity in tastes. Since these diﬀerent versions
are sold at diﬀerent prices, the analysis of customization has often been as-
sociated to that of price personalization (or perfect price discrimination).
It must be stressed that the literature has mainly focussed on the pricing
problem (e.g. Ulph and Vulkan, 2000 and 2001), which has been generally
explained in terms of consumers’ willingness to pay. As an example, most
of the econometrics software is provided in two diﬀerent versions: the most
complete, also most expensive, for professional users, and the simplest, also
cheapest, for light users, tipically students. Indeed, sophisticated collecting-
information systems on consumers’ profiles make it possible nowadays to
1Customization in services may concern transportation, assistance, insurance and guar-
antees, etc.
2Following Shapiro and Varian (1999), I take as information good everything that can
be digitalized: text, images, voice, data, audio and video.
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highly discriminate and personalize prices. The focus of this paper is rather
on the technological aspect - the ability of firms to redisgn easily and quickly
their products in order to match consumers’ desires - and price personaliza-
tion comes as a result of ’technological’ factors and strategic interaction.
As suggested above, product customization is particularly relevant in
digital markets, where the availability of more flexible technologies makes
customization feasible at reasonable low costs: information technologies,
like technologies for processing, reproducing and distributing information,
for example, enable firms to change design and oﬀer quickly and inexpen-
sively one standard item and diﬀerent versions of a good: software packages,
personally configured computers, music, books and video-games are for this
reason considered suitable for customization. Product customization strate-
gies, and the associated price discrimination practices, can be ”more widely
practiced in electronic commerce since the transmutability of digital prod-
ucts make them highly customizable and detailed data on consumer prefer-
ences are more abundant in a computerized market environment” (Choi et al,
1997, p.8-1). Indeed, in the digital markets consumer profiles are easily in-
ferred by web-based transactions 3, which convey information on consumers’
preferences. As real world examples one might quote Dell Computers and
IBM, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, which are increasingly customizing their
products 4. Interesting cases of customization are more often found in the
e-commerce: McGraw Hill publisher, for example, makes now possible to
order a book designed according to the preferred configuration: diﬀerent
chapters of the books are combined by customers and printed or produced
in a media format (CD-ROMs, DVDs or downloadable files from the Inter-
net) on consumer demand.
The decision of a firm to customize a product is a strategic decision
(Wallace, 2004). To customize a product imposes a cost which depends
on technological factors, but it allows the firm to capture a larger share of
consumers - this gain in terms of demand depending on the price paid for re-
ceiving a customized product. This price must reflect the additional burden
borne by the firm. In order to capture this aspects, the most appropriate
general framework is a traditional spatial model in that a customized prod-
uct can be considered as a finely diﬀerentiated product (Choi et al., 1997).
Moreover, in this kind of set-up, the cost of customization can be assimilated
to a transportation cost paid by firms. A famous example of spatial model
3Firms often use the web to collect personal information through cookies, newsletters,
registrations and subscriptions.
4For further examples see Vulkan (2003), pp. 47-48
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in which transportation costs are paid by firms and then translated to con-
sumers is the Thisse and Vives’s (1988) discriminatory pricing model 5 which
perfectly replicates Hotelling’s analogy between spatial location and prefer-
ences: diﬀerent prices charged at each location (diﬀerent delivery prices) can
be seen as diﬀerent prices charged for diﬀerent versions of a basic product.
Using the example oﬀered by Thisse and Vives on cider, the attributes of
the latter, e.g. its diﬀerent levels of sweetness, correspond to the varieties
that are priced diﬀerently, and the price paid for each variety depends on
the ’transport’ cost of altering the basic product. The role of transportation
costs is not discussed in that paper, however they are clearly interpreted
as the technological cost of redesigning the basic product - as Thisse and
Vives state ”How to change the sweetness of cider is a technical detail that
we leave to the imagination of the reader” (p. 125). This is the point this
paper deals with in an economic perspective. If diﬀerent customization tech-
nologies are available, if firms may choose their ’customization’ cost, which
is their optimal choice and its final implications in terms of market structure
and equilibrium prices?
While this issue has not been previously analysed in the product cus-
tomization literature, the problem of endogeneizing transportation costs
has already been studied in a diﬀerent perspective. Von Ungern-Sternberg
(1988) and Hendel and Figueiredo (1997) present respectively a simultaneous
and a sequential game where firms engage in a product design competition
modelled as a transportation cost competition, prior to price competition.
In these Hotelling-type models, uniform pricing policy and perfectly inelastic
market demand are assumed. The extent of transportation cost captures the
so-called general purposeness of products. In the first model simultaneity
leads firms to choose optimally the lowest level of the transportation cost: a
generalist good is therefore produced and this results in a tougher price com-
petition. In the second, the strategic eﬀect on pricing due to the sequential
structure of the game induces firms competing in a duopoly setting to set a
higher level of the transportation cost (they oﬀer a more ’specific purpose’
good or, in other words, they increase the degree of focus of their products),
softening price competition. The results in both models rely on the assump-
tion of costless ability of firms to change focus. However, the existence of a
cost of producing a general purpose product creates an additional incentive
for firms to increase focus in order to save costs.
While in these contributions firms’ competition in transportation costs
5For a review on the issue of price discrimination in imperfectly competitive markets,
see Stole (2003). See also Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
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is interpreted as a design competition leading firms to make their products
more specific or more general with respect to consumers’ preferences, in
this paper the transportation cost competition is assimilated to a techno-
logical competition. Changes in transportation costs are seen as technolog-
ical changes associated to the customization process. Therefore, the pricing
strategies for customized products result from competition in the technology
of customization and from competition in final prices. The main result of
the paper is that this technological competition intensifies price competition
(consistently with the findings in the literature on innovation), leading to a
market configuration characterized by high concentration and low prices for
each variety of the customized good. In a sense the model may be seen as
an attempt to justify the observed phenomenon of mass-customization: a
few basic varieties of products are oﬀered, but in many versions and at low
prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the spatial framework
adopted in the model is briefly described. Section 3 analyses a three stage-
game in which, after profitable entry, firms engage a technological compe-
tition on customization costs and prices. This game is studied under two
alternative hypotheses on the choice of customization costs: in section 3.1
this is assumed to be costless, i.e. firms may choose diﬀerent customiza-
tion technologies without altering the production cost of the basic variety;
in section 3.2 this simplified assumption is relaxed, by positing that more
eﬃciency in customization requires higher set-up costs. In the same section
a brief discussion of the mass-customization phenomenon is also oﬀered.
Finally, some concluding remarks and comments are gathered in section 4.
2 The spatial framework
Competitive product diﬀerentiation under discriminatory pricing allows to
study product customization. As mentioned above, the standard spatial
model of price discrimination drawn from Thisse and Vives (1988) is used
on this purpose. In order to investigate the long run equilibrium generating
by a free-entry process, this framework is combined with the Salop model
(1979).
More specifically, I consider the market for a horizontally diﬀerentiated
product, whose characteristics may be represented as points of a circle. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous in preferences and uniformly distributed on this
circle whose length is normalized to 1. Firms are located symmetrically on
this characteristics space. In what follows a unit demand is assumed at all
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